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Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal
Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven
and Zeisel’s The American Jury
Theodore Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans,
Nicole L. Waters, G. Thomas Munsterman, Stewart J. Schwab,
and Martin T. Wells*
This study uses a new criminal case data set to partially replicate Kalven and
Zeisel’s classic study of judge-jury agreement. The data show essentially the
same rate of judge-jury agreement as did Kalven and Zeisel for cases tried
almost 50 years ago. This study also explores judge-jury agreement as a func-
tion of evidentiary strength (as reported by both judges and juries), evi-
dentiary complexity (as reported by both judges and juries), legal
complexity (as reported by judges), and locale. Regardless of which adju-
dicator’s view of evidentiary strength is used, judges tend to convict more
than juries in cases of “middle” evidentiary strength. Judges tend to acquit
more than juries in cases in which judges regard the evidence favoring the
prosecution as weak. Judges tend to convict more than juries in cases in
which judges regard the evidence favoring the prosecution as strong. Rates
of adjudicator agreement are thus partly a function of which adjudicator’s
view of evidentiary strength is used, a result not available to Kalven and
Zeisel, who were limited to judges’ views of the evidence. We find little evi-
dence that evidentiary complexity or legal complexity help explain rates of
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judge-jury disagreement. Rather, the data support the view that judges 
have a lower conviction threshold than juries. Local variation exists among
the sites studied. The influences of juror race, sex, and education are also
considered.
In a study of 1950s’ criminal trials, Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel, relying
on questionnaire responses from judges, found substantial agreement
between how judges and juries would rule in the same case.1 They also found
that disagreement was asymmetric. Juries tended to acquit when judges
would convict much more than juries tended to convict when judges would
acquit.2 Kalven and Zeisel attributed most instances of judge-jury disagree-
ment to different interpretations of the reasonable-doubt standard, differ-
ent evaluation of the evidence, juror sentiments about the defendant, and
juror disagreement with the law.3 They believed that such factors influenced
the jury when the judge regarded the case as close and capable of support-
ing either conviction or acquittal.4 They also concluded that judge-jury dis-
agreements were not due to jury misunderstanding of the evidence.5 Kalven
and Zeisel’s work is acknowledged to be the first large-scale systematic study
of the jury and remains in many scholars’ minds the most significant.6 “Now
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1Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 58 (1966).
2Id. See Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of The American Jury, 16
Law & Soc. Inquiry 323, 327 (1991).
3Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 1, at 106–11. Minor factors explaining judge-jury disagreement
were facts known only to the judge and disparity in the quality of counsel. Id. at 111. See Hans
& Vidmar, supra note 2, at 328 (summarizing Kalven and Zeisel’s explanations).
4Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 1, at 106, 185; Hans & Vidmar, supra note 2, at 328.
5Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 1, at 149; Hans & Vidmar, supra note 2, at 328.
6Hans & Vidmar, supra note 2; Valerie P. Hans, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Nicole L. Mott & G.
Thomas Munsterman, The Hung Jury: The American Jury’s Insights and Contemporary Under-
standing, 39 Crim. L. Bull. 33 (2003); Wayne A. Logan, Symposium: Reflections on Kalven and
Zeisel’s The American Jury, 39 Crim. L. Bull. 4, 5 (2003) (referring to “the monumental signifi-
cance of Kalven and Zeisel’s work, which for the first time in history subjected the American
criminal jury to comprehensive description and analysis”).
over thirty-five years old, The American Jury remains the benchmark in U.S.
jury research.”7
This article uses a new criminal case database assembled by the
National Center for State Courts (NCSC) to partially replicate the Kalven
and Zeisel study. Based on more than 300 trials in four locales, we find the
rate of judge-jury agreement, over 70 percent, to be substantially the same
as that found by Kalven and Zeisel. We also find a similar asymmetry in the
pattern of disagreement; juries are much more likely to acquit when judges
would convict than they are to convict when judges would acquit.
Following Kalven and Zeisel’s effort to explain the pattern of dis-
agreement between judges and juries, we study the pattern as a function of
evidentiary strength, evidentiary complexity, and legal complexity. The new
data set provides information about evidentiary strength that was not avail-
able to Kalven and Zeisel. The data include the views of four different 
categories of participants—judges, jurors, prosecutors, and defense attor-
neys—about the closeness of the case. Using these different perspectives
about the cases, we find evidence that judges tend to convict more than
juries. This finding addresses one of the themes of criticism of Kalven and
Zeisel—that their analysis depended too much on what judges said about
what jurors thought.8 This study has the reactions of the other actors in the
system as well as judges’ reactions.
We also find that the judicial tendency to convict, relative to the jury,
is not universal. When judges regard evidence of conviction as weak, they
tend to acquit more than juries. The tendency to convict more than juries
does not emerge in all four locales studied. We find little evidence that evi-
dentiary complexity or legal complexity help explain rates of judge-jury dis-
agreement. The judges’ lower conviction threshold seems to be driving most
of the difference.
Section I of this article describes the NCSC data used in this study.
Section II reports on rates of judge-jury disagreement. Section III explores
the sources of judge-jury disagreement by focusing on one explanatory
factor at a time. Section IV combines the factors discussed in Section III in
regression models.
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7Logan, supra note 6, at 5.
8Abraham S. Goldstein, Book Review, 1 Law & Soc’y Rev. 148, 151 (1967); Hans & Vidmar, supra
note 2, at 330, 334. See Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 1, at 50.
A national replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s work was called for 
over a decade ago.9 It has been difficult to achieve because it requires sub-
stantial funding and sustained collaboration of busy, real-world actors and
interested researchers. We acknowledge the limitations inherent in using
just four sites in the current analyses. However, replication of Kalven and
Zeisel’s important work has to start somewhere. We return to this issue in
the conclusion.
I. The Data
The National Center for State Courts gathered the data used in this study
as part of a project, funded by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), to study
hung juries. The NCSC’s report, Are Hung Juries a Problem?, thoroughly
describes the data,10 so the description here, derived from the NCSC report,
is more abbreviated.
Four sites participated in the data collection: the Central Division,
Criminal, of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, California; the 
Maricopa County Superior Court (Phoenix), Arizona; the Bronx County
Supreme Court, New York; and the Superior Court of the District of Colum-
bia. Several criteria shaped site selection. First, each site needed a sufficiently
high volume of felony jury trials to permit data collection within a reason-
able time period. Second, court personnel had to be willing to cooperate in
data collection, including agreeing to adhere to privacy and confidentiality
protocols. Los Angeles and Washington, DC were included because of
reported concerns about hung-jury rates. Maricopa was chosen to study the
effects of an innovative procedure allowing judges to admit further evidence
and arguments in cases with deadlocked juries. The New York State Office
of Court Administration provided suggestions about high-volume courts 
in New York City, and helped secure the Bronx County Supreme Court’s
cooperation.
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9Hans & Vidmar, supra note 2, at 347–48.
10Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Mott & G. Thomas Munsterman, Are
Hung Juries a Problem? (National Center for State Courts Sept. 30, 2002) [hereafter “Hung
Juries”], available at <http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/BesJuriesHungJunesPub.
pdf>. See also Hans et al., supra note 6.
After a pretest in Los Angeles,11 data were collected at the four sites.
Data were collected in Los Angeles from June 2000 through October 2000.12
Maricopa County began data collection in November 2000 and ended in
October 2001.13 Data from the Bronx were collected from February through
August 2001, and data for Washington, DC were collected from April
through August 2001.
Court personnel at the sites distributed and collected questionnaire
packets covering noncapital felony cases in all site courtrooms. The sample
excludes misdemeanor cases because hung juries in felony trials are typically
of greater concern to policymakers. The sample excludes capital cases
because of the sanction’s severity and because of the risk that confidential
juror questionnaire data might be used in litigation. Further information
about the data is available in NCSC’s report.14
A. The Questionnaires
Each packet contained instructions and questionnaires for the judges, attor-
neys, and jurors. Each packet also had a case data form requesting infor-
mation about case characteristics and outcomes. Many of the questions asked
trial participants to give ratings on a seven-point Likert scale. The content
of each questionnaire most relevant to this study is listed below, and is
described more fully in the NCSC report.15
• Case Data Form—type of charge, sentence range, jury’s decision, and
demographic information about the defendant(s) and the victim(s),
voir dire, trial evidence and procedures, and jury deliberations.
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11Hung Juries, supra note 10, at 29.
12This period overlapped with a significant local investigation of the Los Angeles police (the
Ramparts investigation), producing some concern about the typicality of the conviction/acquit-
tal ratio.
13A brief hiatus during this period was the result of some confusion on which cases were to be
included in the study. For a short time, some judges believed that data were to be collected
only if the jury hung. Thus, the number of hung juries in Maricopa County may be higher than
is typically the case. The hung-jury rates in Maricopa were 3.3 percent (hung on all counts),
5.1 percent (hung on Count 1), and 7.7 percent (hung on any count).
14Hung Juries, supra note 10.
15Id. at Appendix A.
• Judge Questionnaire, Part I: Before Jury Verdict—verdict judge would
have reached in bench trial, evaluation of the evidence, case com-
plexity, attorney skill, likelihood that the jury would hang.
• Judge Questionnaire, Part II: After Jury Verdict—reaction to the verdict,
and experience on the bench.
• Attorney Questionnaire, Part I—assessment of voir dire, case complex-
ity, attorney skill, evaluation of the evidence.
• Attorney Questionnaire, Part II—reaction to the verdict, and experi-
ence in legal practice.
• Juror Questionnaire—case complexity, attorney skill, evaluation of the
evidence, formation of opinion, the dynamics of the deliberations
including the first and final votes, juror participation, conflict, reac-
tion to verdict, opinion about applicable law, assessment of criminal
justice in the community, and demographic information.
B. Distribution of Study Packages
Researchers briefed judges and key court personnel about the project and
instructed about how the packet distribution was to occur.16 Packets were
sent from the jury assembly room to the courtrooms with the panel for voir
dire. Once the jury was selected, court personnel distributed the packets to
the judge and/or court clerk. If the case proceeded through to jury delib-
erations, and did not end by a plea agreement, dismissal, or mistrial for some
reason other than the jury’s inability to arrive at a unanimous verdict, the
judge was asked to complete the judge survey. In addition, either the clerk
or the judge was to complete a questionnaire on the general case informa-
tion on a case data form.
Once the jury retired to deliberate, court personnel distributed the
judge and attorney questionnaires. The judges and attorneys were asked to
complete the questionnaires in two stages, answering some questions prior
to the jury decision (Part I) and the remaining questions after the jury ren-
dered its verdict or the case declared a mistrial (Part II). The court person-
nel distributed the final set of questionnaires to the jurors after the verdict
was announced or a mistrial declared. To protect confidentiality, respon-
dents were provided with a blank envelope in which to place the completed
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16See Hung Juries, supra note 10, at 33 (fig. 3.1), for the time sequence of the packet 
distribution.
questionnaire. Court staff collected the completed questionnaires and gave
these to the designated court liaison for each site, who forwarded the cases
to the NCSC for data entry and analysis.
C. Response Rates
The NCSC report summarizes response rates.17 Briefly, case data forms were
returned in 358 of the 401 cases, an 89 percent response rate. Judges com-
pleted 366 (91 percent response rate) questionnaires. Although confiden-
tiality precludes us from linking the data in a particular case to an individual
judge, we are confident that a substantial number of judges are represented
in the sample. For example, in Maricopa County, 29 judges sat in the crim-
inal division in fiscal year 2000–2001.18
There were 576 total attorney questionnaires (either defense or pros-
ecution) completed in 351 cases. At least one attorney responded in 88
percent of the cases and the prosecutor and defense counsel both responded
in 64 percent of the cases. At least one defense attorney completed a form
in 278 cases (69 percent response rate) and at least one prosecuting attor-
ney in 287 cases (72 percent response rate). Overall, 3,626 jurors returned
their questionnaires. The response rate for jurors across all sites, with con-
sideration for jury size, was 80 percent. For the 12-person juries in Los
Angeles, Maricopa, the Bronx, and DC, the average response rate was 11,
10, 8, and 10 jurors, respectively. For the eight-person juries in Maricopa,19
an average of seven jurors responded. The case data form surveys asked
factual information about the criminal charges filed and the jury’s decision,20
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17Id. at 32.
18Email from Judge G. T. Anagnost to Theodore Eisenberg, Jan. 26, 2004. See also note 61 infra.
19In California, New York, and DC, felony cases are tried to a 12-person jury. Arizona law pro-
vides for eight-person juries in felony trials unless the penalty for the defendant includes death
or a potential sentence of 30 years or more, in which case the number of jurors is 12. In 
Maricopa County, there were 30 cases with 12-member juries. Sixty-nine juries had eight
members. In addition, there were six cases with so little information that jury size could not 
be determined.
20If this key information was missing from the questionnaires, NCSC made follow-up inquiries
with the courts. Thirty-one cases without a case data form were salvaged through direct com-
munication with the courts to obtain the key information about the case. The courts were
unable to recover this missing information in 12 cases, which were not included in the final
and led to 382 usable cases. The number of questionnaires included in the
final usable database varied slightly for each site and are summarized in the
NCSC report.21
D. Comments on the Data
The NCSC data have important limitations. A comparative weakness is a
smaller, less geographically diverse sample than Kalven and Zeisel had,
though even Kalven and Zeisel’s sample was criticized as not being repre-
sentative.22 The NCSC data design actively sought locales with enough hung
juries to support a study.23 Like Kalven and Zeisel, one cannot be sure that
the judges in the NCSC sample would have decided to acquit or convict had
the judge actually been adjudicating the case.24 The jury, in contrast, always
made the decision with real-world impact.
The NCSC data were gathered in a legal environment that differs from
Kalven and Zeisel’s, thereby perhaps limiting the range of expected judge-
jury agreement. Juries have become more representative of the community
than they were in the 1950s. Judges have changed as well, but the net change
in jury composition likely is greater. “Although the judiciary has also become
more democratized, it still represents a much narrower segment of society
than the jury. If life experiences of decision makers influence their judg-
ments, juries and judges might disagree more now than they did in the 1950s
when Kalven and Zeisel collected their data.”25 In addition, the gap between
defense and prosecutorial resources may have narrowed since the 1950s. At
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data analysis. Seven additional cases had so little information (three or fewer questionnaires
received) that they were also eliminated from the analysis. For example, a few cases relied on
only one questionnaire from one attorney and were therefore not included.
21Hung Juries, supra note 10, at 33 (tbl. 3.1).
22Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 1, at 36; Hans & Vidmar, supra note 2, at 331 (describing review
of Kalven and Zeisel’s book appearing in the American Sociological Review).
23Hung Juries, supra note 10, at 29.
24Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 1, at 53–54; Goldstein, supra note 8, at 151; Hans & Vidmar, supra
note 2, at 331.
25Hans & Vidmar, supra note 2, at 348 (footnote omitted).
a minimum, Gideon v. Wainwright’s26 requirement of counsel in serious crim-
inal cases (which brought a few states into line with others’ practices), and
Miranda v. Arizona’s27 requirement that defendants be told of this right,
might have effects throughout the criminal process, including trial 
outcomes.
The NCSC data also offer some advantages in explaining results that
were not available to Kalven and Zeisel. The NCSC data design assured that
views of evidence and complexity other than those of the judge were avail-
able, thus reducing an important concern about Kalven and Zeisel’s analy-
sis—that the juries’ attitudes were seen only through the eyes of the judge.
Kalven and Zeisel acknowledged “an inability to know for certain that judges
were providing accurate insights into jury behavior rather than stereotypical
judicial interpretations.”28 In addition, the NCSC data are available at a time
when more sophisticated statistical techniques are available. Statistical con-
cerns about Kalven and Zeisel’s analysis include their failure to supply sig-
nificance levels29 and their tendency to reach conclusions based on small
subsamples of their data.30 Statistical techniques now more widely used, espe-
cially for the categorical data comprising the sample, facilitate studying mul-
tiple factors simultaneously, thereby enriching the analysis.
II. Rates of Agreement
Both replication and enhancement of Kalven and Zeisel’s study are crucial
to determine (1) whether Kalven and Zeisel’s use of the judge’s view of jury
behavior unduly shaped their explanations of disagreement, (2) whether
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26372 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent defendant has right to counsel).
27384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966) (statements obtained from criminal detainees, without warning
of constitutional rights, held inadmissible).
28Hans & Vidmar, supra note 2, at 334.
29A. Paul Hare, Book Review, 32 Am. Soc. Rev. 666, 667 (1967); Herbert Jacob, Book Review,
11 Midw. J. Pol. 282, 283 (1967).
30John Kaplan, Book Review, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 475, 477–78 (1967). Kalven and Zeisel acknowl-
edged that analyzing subgroups of their data “exhausted our sample.” Kalven & Zeisel, supra
note 1, at 91.
changes over time in juror pools, the flow of cases to the jury, or the crimi-
nal justice system alter their basic findings, and (3) to help resolve incon-
sistencies between Kalven and Zeisel’s findings and some experimental
results.31
A. Compared to Kalven and Zeisel
To facilitate comparison of judge-jury agreement rates in the NCSC data with
the rates reported by Kalven and Zeisel, we initially follow the Kalven and
Zeisel decision to allocate hung juries evenly across convictions and acquit-
tals.32 Panel A of Table 1 reports the agreement rates for the NCSC data.33
This table is directly comparable to Kalven and Zeisel’s famous Table 12,
which is reproduced as Panel B of Table 1.
Table 1’s most striking feature is the similarity of Panels A and B. The
total rate of agreement in Panel A, computed by adding the percentage of
cases in which judges and juries agreed to acquit or convict is 75 percent.
The total rate of agreement in Panel B is 78 percent. Even with the large
number of observations, we cannot reject, at conventional levels of statisti-
cal significance (p = 0.160), the hypothesis that the agreement rates are the
same.
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31Experimental research, for example, suggests that compared to judges, jurors may have lower
rather than higher standards of reasonable doubt. Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton,
Legal vs. Quantified Definitions of Standards of Proof, 9 Law & Hum. Behav. 159 (1985)
(college students’ mock verdicts not affected by different legal standards). Experimental
research also suggests that jurors have difficulty in distinguishing standards of proof. Simon
and Mahon asked 106 judges and 25 jurors to convert the “reasonable doubt” and “prepon-
derance of the evidence standards” into numerical terms. Rita James Simon & Linda Mahan,
Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A View from the Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 Law &
Soc’y Rev. 319 (1971). Judges distinguished between the two standards, requiring an 89 percent
probability of an event for the “reasonable doubt” standard and 61 percent for the civil stan-
dard. Jurors did not distinguish between the two standards, and reported probabilities of 79
percent and 77 percent for the two standards, respectively. Kassin and Wrightsman point out
that juries are unlikely to be as oblivious to burdens of proof as experimental research suggests.
The pattern of jury behavior in experimental work suggests that, relative to the judge, jurors
should favor the prosecution in criminal trials. Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, The
American Jury on Trial: Psychological Perspectives 156 (1988). Yet Kalven and Zeisel’s data
suggest the opposite, finding juries more likely to exhibit leniency in criminal cases. Id.
32Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 1, at 58.
33In 79 cases judges did not provide a hypothetical verdict, and in an additional 28 cases there
were mixed jury verdicts that could not be classified as predominantly convictions or acquit-
tals. Hans et al., supra note 6, at 56 n.129.
Panel A’s asymmetry of disagreement also matches Kalven and Zeisel’s
data. Jurors in both data sets are much more likely to disagree with a judge’s
decision to convict than with a judge’s decision to acquit. A McNemar test
of the significance of the asymmetry of the disagreement pattern in Panel A
yields a p value of less than 0.0001 and the p value for Panel B is vanishingly
small. Thus, looking at the cases of disagreement between judge and jury, it
is extremely unlikely that the higher conviction rate by judges in cases of dis-
agreement would emerge by chance. We do note, however, a greater ten-
dency of jurors in the NCSC sample to convict when the judge would acquit
than was present in the Kalven and Zeisel sample. Limiting the sample to
cases of disagreement, this increase, from 14 percent of disagreement cases
in Kalven and Zeisel’s data (3 percent out of the 22 percent of cases in which
disagreement occurred), to 24 percent of disagreement cases in the NCSC
data (6 percent out of the 25 percent of cases in which disagreement
occurred), is statistically significant (p = 0.018).34
Kalven and Zeisel’s Table 12 was a simplification of their Table 11, in
which they separately reported rates of hung juries, rather than allocate
hung-jury cases equally between convictions and acquittals as in their Table
12.35 Table 2 reproduces Kalven and Zeisel’s Table 11 and shows the same
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34If one excludes hung-jury cases, based on the figures reported in Table 2, the difference is
more significant (p = 0.007).
35Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 1, at 56. Other protocols for reporting disagreement could be fol-
lowed. Kalven and Zeisel later report agreement rates that account for the fact that some cases
involve multiple counts and that judges and juries could agree to convict but disagree on the
Table 1: Judge-Jury Agreement on Conviction
Jury Acquits Jury Convicts
A. NCSC Data
Judge acquits 13% 6%
Judge convicts 19% 62%
B. Kalven & Zeisel Data
Judge acquits 14% 3%
Judge convicts 19% 64%
Note: Panel A is based on the NCSC data covering 290 nonhung-jury trials with both 
judge and jury data, and 28 hung-jury trials, at four sites in 2000–2001. Panel B is based on the
Kalven and Zeisel data covering 3,576 trials before 555 judges in 47 states and the District of
Columbia in 1954, 1955, and 1958.
information for the NCSC data. Excluding hung-jury cases, Kalven and Zeisel
show judge-jury agreement in 75.4 percent of cases and the NCSC data show
judge-jury agreement in 70.5 percent of cases. The difference, while not sta-
tistically significant, is somewhat larger than that suggested in following their
decision to evenly allocate hung-jury cases.
Table 2 also shows that the hung-jury rate is somewhat higher in the
NCSC data (8.8 percent) than in the Kalven and Zeisel data (5.5 percent).
This is not surprising because some jurisdictions were selected for study
because of a belief that they might have high hung-jury rates.36 Even so, the
3.3 percent difference in hung-jury rates is probably a bit high. Kalven and
Zeisel report that their data may understate the true rate of hung juries
because of their judges’ decisions about what constituted a reportable trial.37
Some trials ending in hung juries might have gone unreported. Other rea-
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count. Judge and jury agreed to convict on the same count in 56.8 percent of cases. Id. at 60
(tbl. 13). Adding this figure to the 13 percent of cases in which they agreed to acquit yields an
agreement rate of 69.8 percent. See Hung Juries, supra note 10, at 55–56, for a measure of
agreement that accounts for multiple charge cases.
36Hung Juries, supra note 10, at 29 (“Two sites were included because of reported concerns
about hung jury rates (Los Angeles and Washington, DC).”).
37Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 1, at 57 (“Since our instructions to the judges as to what consti-
tutes a reportable jury trial were perhaps imprecise on the point, it is possible that some felt
no need to report on what is technically a mistrial.”).
Table 2: Judge-Jury Agreement, Including Hung-Jury Cases
Jury Acquits Jury Convicts Hung Jury
A. NCSC Data
Judge acquits 11.6% 5.0% 1.9%
Judge convicts 16.0% 58.5% 6.9%
B. Kalven & Zeisel Data
Judge acquits 13.4% 2.2% 1.1%
Judge convicts 16.9% 62.0% 4.4%
Note: Panel A is based on the NCSC data covering 290 nonhung-jury trials with both 
judge and jury data, and 28 hung-jury trials, at four sites in 2000–2001. Panel B is based on the
Kalven and Zeisel data covering 3,576 trials before 555 judges in 47 states and the District of
Columbia in 1954, 1955, and 1958.
sonably systematic evidence supports the notion that Kalven and Zeisel’s data
understate modern hung-jury rates.38
B. Variation Across Sites
1. Agreement Rates
The four NCSC sites vary in their rates of agreement, as described in Table
3.39 The pattern of agreement varies both in magnitude and overall direc-
tion. The rate of judge-jury agreement varies from 64 percent in DC to 89
percent in Maricopa. Do these results meaningfully differ from Kalven and
Zeisel? We cannot know for certain because Kalven and Zeisel do not report
site-specific rates of judge-jury agreement. In an appendix, however, they
describe a few other studies reporting site-specific rates of agreement,
ranging from 72 percent in civil cases to 89 percent in criminal cases.40 We
suspect that Kalven and Zeisel’s aggregate rates of agreement of over 70
percent are likely the result of locales in which agreement rates were less
than 70 percent and in which agreement rates exceeded 80 percent, as well
as locales in which agreement rates were in the 70 percent range. If that is
so, then the NCSC data may not materially differ. More definitive word on
local variation must await samples that encompass additional jurisdictions.
For now, we merely note that Kalven and Zeisel’s aggregated reporting of
results may mask material local differences.
If one focuses not on agreement with Kalven and Zeisel’s data, but on
agreement across the four sites, local variation also exists. Table 3 shows that
the four sites had judge-jury agreement rates of 88 percent, 89 percent, 66
percent, and 64 percent—two higher agreement-rate jurisdictions and two
lower agreement-rate jurisdictions. A pair-wise comparison of each of the
sites indicates that the differences between higher and lower agreement-rate
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38Hung Juries, supra note 10, at 6–9; Paula L. Hannaford, Valerie P. Hans & G. Thomas Mun-
sterman, How Much Justice Hangs in the Balance? A New Look at Hung Jury Rates, 83 Judi-
cature 59 (1999).
39For analysis of site-based differences of jurors’ votes in the cases studied here, see Stephen P.
Garvey, Paula Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Mott, G. Thomas Munsterman &
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sites are statistically significant (p = 0.001). That is, Los Angeles’s rate of
agreement significantly differs from both the Bronx’s and DC’s. Maricopa’s
rate of agreement similarly differs. But Los Angeles’s agreement rate does
not significantly differ from Maricopa’s and the Bronx’s does not signifi-
cantly differ from DC’s.
Interpretation of intersite disagreement patterns requires caution.
Within-site variation between judge and jury is so revealing because the two
adjudicators assess the same cases. Intersite comparisons require consider-
ing the fact that the sites process different cases. A lower agreement rate in
the Bronx could be a function of different routing of cases to juries than the
routing in, for example, Los Angeles. To illustrate, suppose Bronx juries have
a reputation for being prone to acquit. That information would be factored
into prosecution and defense decisions about which cases to plea bargain
and which cases to press to trial. This pretrial process could lead to differ-
ent mixes of cases reaching trial in the four jurisdictions. Interpreting the
trial results in light of this selection process is as much art as science.41 Our
principal focus here is on inferences that can be drawn from judge-jury
observation of the same cases.
2. Asymmetrical Disagreement
In Los Angeles, the Bronx, and DC, Table 3 shows that the asymmetry in
judge-jury conviction tendency, when they see the same case, is in the direc-
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Table 3: Judge-Jury Agreement, by Site
Jury Acquits Jury Convicts Jury Acquits Jury Convicts
Los Angeles (88%; p = 0.070) Maricopa (89%; p = 0.508)
Judge acquits 7 1 14 6
Judge convicts 7 52 3 56
Bronx (66%; p = 0.093) DC (64%; p < 0.001)
Judge acquits 9 7 7 2
Judge convicts 16 36 25 42
Note: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001. Cells report numbers of cases.
Agreement rates and p values of disagreement pattern (which ignore cases of agreement) in
parentheses.
tion found by Kalven and Zeisel—judges tend to convict when juries would
acquit more than juries tend to convict when judges would acquit. The asym-
metry is statistically significant or nearly so in the three jurisdictions. In Mari-
copa, however, juries tend to convict when judges would convict, though the
difference is not statistically significant. Again, it seems likely that Kalven and
Zeisel’s aggregate summaries mask interesting local variation.
III. Explaining Judge-Jury Disagreement
Section II indicates that judges and juries do sometimes disagree, and that
the general direction of the disagreement suggests less judicial sympathy for
defendants. This section explores some possible bases for judges’ higher
conviction rates: juries’ different application of the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard, juries’ different reaction to evidentiary complexity,42 and
juries’ different reaction to legal complexity.
A. The Jury’s Higher Conviction Threshold
Kalven and Zeisel, through a reasoned process of elimination, satisfied them-
selves that one source of judge-jury disagreement is that judges and juries
apply different standards of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal
cases. “[T]he jury’s more stringent view of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is one explanation for disagreements between the two deciders in criminal
cases.”43 Kalven and Zeisel even regarded the major evidentiary effect they
detected—the jury’s greater tendency to believe the defendant—as subject
to the competing explanation of disagreement: that the jury applied a higher
evidentiary threshold to convict than the judge.44
The NCSC data contain evidence confirming this belief in the jury’s
more stringent view of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the data
suggest a pattern somewhat more complex than Kalven and Zeisel were able
to report.
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43Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 1, at 189.
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NCSC questionnaires asked both judges and juries to rank, on a scale
of one to seven, the strength of the evidence favoring conviction, with 1 rep-
resenting the weakest evidence of conviction and 7 the strongest. Panels A,
B, and C of Table 4 report judge-jury agreement data for each of three levels
of evidentiary strength: weak (1 and 2 on the scale), medium (3, 4, and 5
on the scale), and strong (6 and 7 on the scale). Table 4 reports in its “Judge”
columns the rates of agreement with the cases classified by the judge’s view
of the strength of the evidence. Table 4’s “Jury” columns report judge-jury
agreement with the cases classified by the jury’s view of the strength of the
evidence. The jury values are rounded based on the average of the individ-
ual jurors’ responses.
For example, Panel A reports results for cases in which the evidence
favoring conviction was weak. According to the “Judge” columns, when the
judge regarded the evidence as weak, the judge and jury agreed on acquit-
tal in 14 cases and agreed on conviction in seven cases. The jury would
convict when the judge would not in five cases and the judge would convict
when the jury would not in zero cases. Thus, not surprisingly, when the judge
regarded the evidence as weak, the judge tended to convict less than the
jury. Panel A’s “Jury” columns show the opposite effect when the evidentiary
strength is classified as weak based on the jurors’ reports of the evidence.
That is, when the jury regarded the evidence as weak, the jury would acquit
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Table 4: Judge and Jury Agreement, by Evidentiary Strength of Case
Adjudicator Whose View of Evidentiary Strength Classifies Evidence as Weak,
Medium, or Strong
Judge Jury
Jury Acquits Jury Convicts Jury Acquits Jury Convicts
A. Cases in Which Evidence of Conviction is WEAK (1 or 2 on Likert Scale)
Judge acquits 14 5 15 2
Judge convicts 0 7 9 3
B. Cases in Which Evidence of Conviction is MEDIUM (3, 4, or 5 on Likert Scale)
Judge acquits 23 10 21 10
Judge convicts 35 81 37 81
C. Cases in Which Evidence of Conviction is STRONG (6 or 7 on Likert Scale)
Judge acquits 0 1 0 3
Judge convicts 15 97 2 92
Note: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001. Cells report numbers of cases.
in nine cases in which the judge would convict, and the judge would acquit
in only two cases in which the jury would convict.
Panel A suggests the importance of whose view of the evidentiary
strength is used. Kalven and Zeisel had only the judges’ views and were crit-
icized on that ground.45 A richer and more complex picture emerges by rec-
ognizing that evidentiary strength may be perceived differently by different
observers.
Panel A’s cases comprise a small fraction of the total because neither
the judge nor the jury often regard the evidence as weak. Prosecutors do
not randomly press cases to trial and, on average, the evidence should be
well above the subjective level of “weak.” In Panel B, where we classify the
evidence as being of medium strength, an important pattern emerges in a
larger class of cases. Here, regardless of which observer classifies evidentiary
strength, the judge is more prone to convict than the jury. Judges who regard
the evidentiary strength as medium would convict in 35 cases in which the
jury acquitted, and the jury convicted in only 10 cases in which the judge
would acquit. When the jury regards the evidentiary strength as medium,
the judge would convict in 37 cases in which the jury acquitted, and the jury
convicted in only 10 cases in which the judge would acquit.
Panel C, which also covers many more cases than Panel A, again shows
the importance of whose evidentiary standards apply. Judges who regard the
evidence favoring conviction as strong were willing to convict 15 defendants
that the jury acquitted. When the jury regards the evidence as strong, the
judge would convict in all but three cases.
Graphical representation of the judge and jury conviction behavior as
a function of evidentiary strength is also revealing. Figure 1 shows the rela-
tion between the judges’ views of the evidence and the rate at which judges
would, and juries did, convict. For each of the seven levels of evidentiary
strength, the figure reports the mean conviction rate for juries in one line
and for judges in the other. The figure suggests that the jury had more of a
“yes-no” evidentiary threshold for conviction than did the judge. The direc-
tion of this jury tendency is clear. Juries required a case more favorable to
the prosecution to support a conviction.
Figure 1 shows that, unless the judges’ views of the evidence favoring
the prosecution reached the level of at least “5” on the 1–7 scale, juries did
not consistently vote to convict in more than 50 percent of the cases. Judges,
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in contrast, would have exceeded a 50 percent conviction rate for evidence
reaching the level of a “4” on the 1–7 scale. The jump in the jury conviction
rate from cases with evidentiary strength reported by the judge as “4” to cases
with evidence strength reported by the judge as “5” is striking. Jurors con-
victed at about a 50 percent rate at the “4” (or lower) level. Their convic-
tion rate jumps to near 80 percent for evidence at the “5” or higher level.
Juries required that a case be at least a “5” on the judge’s closeness-of-case
scale to support high conviction rates. Nearly half the juries found reason-
able doubt below what the judge regarded as a strong evidentiary showing
by the prosecutor.
Figure 1’s second line shows that judges also exhibit a jump in will-
ingness to convict as evidence crosses from the equivocal “4” to the pro-
prosecution “5.” But the judicial jump is from the relatively higher convic-
tion rate of 65 percent to over 90 percent.
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Figure 1: Convictions and evidentiary strength: judges’ view of the evidence.
Note: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001. Each line shows on the y-axis the
mean conviction rate at each of seven levels of evidentiary strength, as evaluated by judges.
Higher numbers along the x-axis indicate higher levels of evidentiary strength favoring con-
viction. The “Proportion Jury Convictions” line shows the observed conviction rates. The “Pro-
portion Judge Convictions” line is based on the judges’ indication whether they would convict.
Source: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001.
Employing the juries’ view of the closeness of the evidence, rather than
the judges’, reinforces Figure 1’s key findings. Figure 2 uses the juries’
reports of how much the evidence favored the prosecution, also on a 1–7
scale, with the jury average computed from the jurors’ individual responses
and then rounded to an integer. Judges are willing to convict in cases much
less favorable to the prosecution, as ranked by the juries’ view of the evi-
dence, than are juries. Quantum increases in juries’ willingness to convict
emerge as the evidence favoring the prosecution moves from “3” to “4” and
from “4” to “5.” Judges’ willingness to convict exceeds 50 percent of cases
even when jurors regard the evidence as largely favorable to the defense—
“3” on the 1–7 scale. As the evidence favoring the prosecution moves from
“4” to “5,” jurors’ willingness to convict soars to over 90 percent. Note also
that the judges’ reported rate of willingness to convict is almost monotoni-
cally increasing as the jurors regard the evidence as increasingly pro-prose-
cution. Judges and juries seem to be reacting to the evidence in a similar
manner, except that juries require stronger evidence to convict than judges
do.
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Figure 2: Convictions and evidentiary strength: juries’ view of the evidence.
Source: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001.
B. Evidentiary Complexity as an Explanation of Disagreement
Kalven and Zeisel concluded that juries understood the evidence well and
that juror confusion about the evidence was not the source of much dis-
agreement. The above discussion of evidentiary strength suggests the impor-
tance of considering which decider’s view of the evidence to use. Similarly,
complexity is not a purely objective concept. Judges and juries might well
regard evidentiary complexity differently.46 So it is important to consider
complexity’s influence on agreement rates from both the judges’ and the
juries’ perspectives. The NCSC questionnaires asked both judges and jurors
to rank each case’s evidentiary complexity on a one to seven Likert scale. We
can assess complexity’s influence on agreement using both the judges’ and
the juries’ reports of complexity.
Table 5 mimics Table 4’s structure by showing agreement rates sepa-
rately for judge and jury reports of complexity (in contrast to the eviden-
tiary strength that was Table 4’s focus). Preliminarily, the table shows that
judges tended to regard most cases as being of low complexity whereas jurors
tended to regard most cases as being of medium complexity. Neither
regarded even 10 percent of the cases as being highly complex.
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Table 5: Judge and Jury Conviction Rates, by Evidentiary Complexity
Adjudicator Whose View of Evidence Complexity Classifies Complexity as Low,
Medium, or High
Judge Jury
Jury Acquits Jury Convicts Jury Acquits Jury Convicts
A. Cases in Which Complexity is LOW (1 or 2 on Likert Scale)
Judge acquit 22 11 11 3
Judge convict 30 109 4 27
B. Cases in Which Complexity is MEDIUM (3, 4, or 5 on Likert Scale)
Judge acquit 14 4 25 11
Judge convict 16 70 42 136
C. Cases in Which Complexity is HIGH (6 or 7 on Likert Scale)
Judge acquit 1 1 0 1
Judge convict 5 6 2 13
Note: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001. Cells report numbers of cases.
The table also suggests that rates of disagreement are not strongly asso-
ciated with complexity, regardless of which adjudicator’s assessment of com-
plexity is used. In cases in which the judge regarded the evidence as being
of low complexity, the adjudicators agreed on the outcome in 131 of 172 (76
percent) cases. When the judge regarded the evidence as being of medium
complexity, they agreed on 84 of 104 (81 percent) of the cases. In cases in
which the jury regarded the evidence as being of low complexity, the adju-
dicators agreed on the outcome in 38 of 45 (84 percent) cases. When the
jury regarded the evidence as being of medium complexity, they agreed on
161 of 214 (75 percent) of the cases, not significantly different than the
agreement rate in low complexity cases (p = 0.243). The strongest hint of
increasing disagreement with increasing complexity is the agreement rate in
seven of the 13 cases (54 percent) that the judge regarded as being of high
complexity.
Table 5 also shows the persistent asymmetry in cases of judge-jury dis-
agreement. In both Panels A and B, judges would convict when juries acquit-
ted more than juries convicted when judges would acquit. The judge’s lower
conviction threshold does not appear to be a function of case complexity,
regardless of which decider’s view of complexity is used.
In summary, the data support Kalven and Zeisel’s conclusion that per-
ceived complexity is not a promising explanation of judge-jury disagree-
ment. The data are more consistent with the jury having a higher threshold
for conviction.
C. Legal Complexity as an Explanation of Disagreement
The NCSC questionnaire also asked the judges to rank the complexity of the
law in each case on a one to seven scale. Understandably, the NCSC did not
ask the jurors to opine about the question of legal complexity. To analyze
the judges’ views as they may relate to judge-jury disagreement, we again
divide the sample into cases of low, medium, and high complexity. Table 6
reports the disagreement pattern separately for each of the three legal com-
plexity levels.
For cases ranked low in legal complexity, judges and juries agreed in
116 of 149 (78 percent) cases. At the medium level of complexity, they
agreed in 85 of 111 (77 percent) of cases. In cases of high legal complexity,
they agreed in 21 of 29 (72 percent) cases, a rate insignificantly different
from the rate in low complexity cases (p = 0.630). Increasing legal complexity
thus is also not a promising explanation of judge-jury disagreement. Table
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6 also shows that the asymmetry of disagreement survives at each level of
complexity.
In sum, neither legal complexity nor evidentiary complexity is helpful
in explaining the overall pattern of judge-jury disagreement.
D. Difference in Agreement Rates Across Crimes
Kalven and Zeisel report judge-jury agreement rates for each of 42 crimes.47
The NCSC data identify 19 different crimes; a useful summary of the major
crimes by locale appears elsewhere.48 Based on analyses not reported here,
little insight is gained into the pattern of disagreement by focusing on indi-
vidual crimes, with two exceptions. In two crime categories, site-specific rates
of disagreement are worth noting. Drug-sale cases in the Bronx produce a
judge-jury agreement rate of only 53.8 percent in 13 cases with usable data.
Weapons cases in the District of Columbia produce agreement in only 33.3
percent of 12 cases. The small numbers in the site-specific drug sales and
weapons cases suggest caution in assigning substantial importance to these
disagreement rates. We defer incorporating this information into regression
models analysis until considering other factors.
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Table 6: Judge and Jury Conviction Rates, by Judges’ View of Cases’ 
Legal Complexity
Jury Acquits Jury Convicts
A. Cases in Which Legal Complexity is LOW (1 or 2 on Likert Scale)
Judge acquit 22 7
Judge convict 26 94
B. Cases in Which Legal Complexity is MEDIUM (3, 4, or 5 on Likert Scale)
Judge acquit 12 8
Judge convict 18 73
C. Cases in Which Legal Complexity is HIGH (6 or 7 on Likert Scale)
Judge acquit 3 1
Judge convict 7 18
Note: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001. Cells report numbers of cases.
E. Juror Characteristics
Substantial evidence exists both questioning and supporting the influence
of juror demographic characteristics on case outcomes.49 The NCSC data
include responses from more than 3,000 jurors. But Kalven and Zeisel
reported their results at the jury level. So we do not address here the rela-
tion between individual juror votes and case outcomes.50 This analysis studies
the influence of juror demographic factors by aggregating juror character-
istics at the case level.51 For example, if six of ten juror questionnaires in a
case indicate that the juror was male, the variable “male” would have the
value 0.6 in the jury-level aggregated data. Table 7, Panel A, provides descrip-
tive statistics for juries.
Panel B reports jury characteristics broken down by patterns of agree-
ment with judges. For example, Panel B’s second row shows that the percent
of African Americans on juries was fairly constant, 20 percent to 23 percent,
for cases in which judges and juries agreed about conviction or acquittal,
and in which the judge would acquit where the jury convicted. In the small
class of cases in which the jury acquitted when the judge would have con-
victed, the mean percent of African Americans on juries was substantially
higher, 37 percent. Similarly, larger Hispanic presence on the jury appears
to be associated with increased likelihood of the jury convicting when the
judge would acquit.
We again defer formal tests of these effects until we combine these vari-
ables with evidentiary strength variables in regression models.
IV. Regression Analysis
Section III suggests that a different conviction threshold, and not eviden-
tiary or legal complexity, is a strong candidate for explaining judge-jury dif-
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ferences. However, a different threshold can hardly be the sole factor worth
considering. Kalven and Zeisel explored several other factors. Shifting from
univariate to multivariate analysis, our goal is to explore whether Section
III’s core result—the different conviction threshold—survives accounting for
other salient characteristics.
A. The Conviction Threshold
Logistic regression models allow examination of conviction as a function of
multiple factors, including strength of evidence. The dependent variable in
the models is conviction. To allow simultaneous consideration of both adju-
dicators’ conviction propensity, as well as other factors, the data are organ-
ized as two observations of each trial, one observation by the judge and one
observation by the jury. The dependent variable “convict” is coded as 1 for
the jury observation if the jury did convict and for the judge observation if
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Table 7: Judge-Jury Agreement and Juror Characteristics
A. Descriptive Statistics of Jury Characteristics
Mean Median N
Percent male jurors 42% 44% 361
Percent African-American jurors 26% 20% 363
Percent Hispanic jurors 22% 17% 363
Percent previously served on jury 53% 50% 364
Education (1–5 scale) 3.49 3.50 364
B. Juror Characteristics and Judge-Jury Agreement
Judge Convict Judge Acquit
Jury Convict Jury Acquit Jury Acquit Jury Convict
Percent male jurors 44% 38% 37% 42%
Percent African-American jurors 23% 37% 20% 21%
Percent Hispanic jurors 22% 18% 24% 29%
Percent previously served on jury 52% 54% 51% 49%
Education (1–5 scale) 3.46 3.62 3.57 3.18
Note: Panel B percents are the percent of jurors with the row characteristic comprising the
jurors who sat in cases with the column characteristic. For example, males comprised 44 percent
of the jurors who sat in cases in which the judge would convict and the jury did convict. The
table is based on the NCSC data covering four sites in 2000–2001. Education coding: 1 = not
high school graduate, 2 = high school graduate, 3 = some college, 4 = college graduate, 5 =
postgraduate work.
the judge would have convicted. It is coded 0 for the jury observation if the
jury did not convict and for the judge observation if the judge would not
have convicted. To capture the adjudicator effect, the models include a
judge dummy variable. It is coded 1 for all the judicial observations of the
data.
Since each case is “observed” twice, four possible combinations of
values of the “convict” variable and the judge dummy variable exist. If judge
and jury agree on conviction, “convict” is 1 for both values (0 and 1) of the
judge dummy variable. If the judge would convict but the jury acquitted, the
judge observation of the trial would have “convict” equal to 1 and the jury
observation of the trial (for which the judge dummy variable is 0) would
have “convict” equal to 0. If the jury convicted but the judge would have
acquitted in the same case, the judge observation of the trial would have
“convict” equal to 0 and the jury observation of the trial (for which the judge
dummy variable is 0) would have “convict” equal to 1. If judge and jury agree
on acquittal, “convict” is 0 for both values (0 and 1) of the judge dummy
variable. Table 8 enumerates the possible coding combinations of the key
variables—“Convict” and “Judge Dummy”—in four hypothetical trials.
To explore whether judge and jury conviction thresholds differ, while
holding other factors constant, the variable of key interest is the judge
dummy explanatory variable. Except for the judge dummy variable, the
explanatory variables for the two observations of each case are identical. The
dependent variable, “Convict,” can also vary across the two observers of each
case, judge and jury.
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Table 8: Coding of Conviction and Judge Dummy Variables
Judge
Dependent Dummy
Trial Variable = Explanatory Other Explanatory
Number “Convict” Variable Variables Verbal Description
1 1 1 Constant within Trial 1 Judge would convict; jury did
1 0
2 1 1 Constant within Trial 2 Judge would convict; jury didn’t
0 0
3 0 1 Constant within Trial 3 Judge would acquit; jury did
1 0
4 0 1 Constant within Trial 4 Judge would acquit; jury didn’t
0 0
Kalven and Zeisel’s findings, and Sections II and III above, forecast that
the judge dummy variable’s coefficient should be positive—corresponding
to an increased likelihood of conviction compared to the jury. That is, the
likelihood of conviction should increase with the observation of the trial
being by the judge rather than by the jury. To test the robustness of this
result, and to explore other possible influences on conviction, we model the
dependent variable “convict” as a function of the judge dummy variable, of
the juror characteristics described in Table 7, of the crime characteristics
described in Section III.D above, and of the site of the trial.
Table 9 reports the results. Models 1–4 account for the stratification of
the sample by site. Models 5–8 employ dummy variables for each site, with
Los Angeles serving as the reference category. For each of the two groups
of models, three measures of the evidentiary strength favoring conviction
are used. Models 1 and 5 include both the judges’ and the juries’ reports of
evidentiary strength. Models 2 and 6 include only the judges’ reports of evi-
dentiary strength. Models 3 and 7 include only the juries’ reports of evi-
dentiary strength. Models 4 and 8 employ no measure of evidentiary
strength.
1. Judge Effects
In all models the judge dummy variable is positive and statistically signifi-
cant. Regardless of whose view of evidentiary strength is used, judges tend
to convict more than juries. Controls for juror characteristics, case charac-
teristics, and locale do not change this core result. The magnitude of the
effect is substantial. Depending on the model selected, the marginal effect
of a judge trial compared to a jury trial is at least a 12 percent increase in
probability of conviction.
2. Evidentiary Strength Effects
Table 9 yields other interesting results. Studies suggest that evidentiary
strength so dominates case outcomes that influences of other factors are dif-
ficult to detect.52 The data offer a rare nonexperimental opportunity to test
the influence of other factors while controlling for the strength of the evi-
dence. The evidentiary strength variables behave as one would expect. In all
models in which they are used, all evidentiary strength variable coefficients
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are positive and highly statistically significant. Regardless of which adjudi-
cator’s view of evidentiary strength is used, stronger evidence of guilt is
strongly associated with increased likelihood of conviction.
One concern about using evidentiary strength as an explanatory vari-
able is that assessments of evidentiary strength in a case may not be inde-
pendent of juror characteristics or even of case characteristics. Male jurors
may react to evidence differently than female jurors. Jurors may react to evi-
dence in a weapons case, where no one is harmed and no property is taken,
differently than they react to evidence in other cases. The evidentiary
strength variables may be absorbing some of what is interesting in the other
variables. Models 4 and 8 address this concern by omitting both evidentiary
strength variables. Their results are reasonably consistent with the models
that include evidentiary strength variables.
3. Case and Juror Effects
Holding constant the evidence, Table 9 offers little robust support for the
conventional wisdom that an increased African-American presence on juries
corresponds to a lower likelihood of conviction.53 The coefficient on the
“African-American percent of jury” variable is positive in seven of eight
models and is statistically significant in two models, in the direction of
greater conviction likelihood. The coefficient changes sign in one model.
Similarly, the Hispanic percent of juries provides little explanatory power
about case outcomes.54
Table 9 provides some evidence that the male percentage of the jury
is associated with increased conviction likelihood. In all eight models, the
“Male percent of jury” coefficient is positive and in three it is statistically sig-
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53Since we study only aggregated juror effects, the finding of no race effect does not eliminate
the possibility that race effects would emerge in studying individual juror votes. See Eisenberg
et al., supra note 51, at 300–01; Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells,
Victim Characteristics and Victim Impact Evidence in South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 Cornell
L. Rev. 306, 334 tbl. 7 (2003).
54The significance of the “African-American percent of jury” variable in Models 1 and 3 is in
part a function of a significant relation between jurors’ view of evidentiary strength and race.
In models of juror view of evidentiary strength, African-American jurors view evidence as less
strong than white jurors. However, this effect does not persist when one controls for site. To
fully explore the relation between juror characteristics and conviction, one could develop
models that account for possible endogeneity in the relation between evidentiary strength and
juror characteristics.
nificant or nearly so. Similarly, increased education levels correspond with
a decreased likelihood of conviction in all models. The “Education level”
coefficient is negative and of reasonably stable magnitude in all models, but
is nearly statistically significant in only one model.55
Table 9 also shows a consistently negative, and sometimes significant,
association between the trial being about a weapons charge and the likeli-
hood of conviction. Perhaps weapons charges often are a last-gasp count
charged by prosecutors who lack sufficient evidence of a murder, robbery,
or attempt, but wish to incarcerate someone they regard as a bad actor. Adju-
dicators may react negatively to what appears to be close to an anticipatory
prosecution. In addition, jurisdictions often have mandatory sentences or
enhancements in cases involving weapons offenses.56 If juries know of such
provisions, and regard mandatory sentences or enhancements for such
crimes as unfair, one may observe lower conviction rates in such cases.
Other plausible models of conviction are worth exploring. If the
higher-threshold theory is correct, the judges’ greater conviction proneness
ought to emerge when evidence is viewed from the perspective of third
parties. The NCSC data contain not only the judges’ and juries’ reports of
evidentiary strength, but also those of prosecutors and defense attorneys. We
have explored models similar to those in Table 9 that use these others’ views
of evidentiary strength to control for the merits of cases. In virtually all such
models, the judge dummy variable is associated with increased likelihood of
conviction. The one exception, echoing Table 4’s results, is that when one
uses the judges’ views of the evidence, and the view is that the evidence is
weak, the judge is less likely to convict than the jury. Table 9’s results suggest
that this effect is swamped by the many cases of middling or strong eviden-
tiary strength, in which the judge is uniformly more likely to convict than
the jury.
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55Endogeneity, see note 54 supra, is less of a concern with respect to “Male percent of jury” and
“Education level” because these variables are not statistically significant in models of eviden-
tiary strength.
56For example, Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13–604(F) (2001) (person convicted of lesser felonies involving
the use or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon “shall not be eligible for suspension of
sentence, probation, pardon or release from confinement on any basis” except narrow condi-
tions); Cal. Penal Code §§12020(a)(1) (up to one-year prison term for possession of many
weapons); 1203(e)(11) (limiting probation chances for certain weapons-related offenses).
4. Site-Level Analysis
Table 9 aggregates the data, yet Table 3 indicates that local variation exists.
The Appendix reports models similar to those in Table 9 for each of the four
sites separately. The models confirm the pattern suggested by Table 3’s site-
level 2 ¥ 2 tables. In Los Angeles and DC, judges are significantly more likely
to convict than juries. In the Bronx, the effect is in the same direction but
is not statistically significant. In Maricopa, the effect is in the opposite direc-
tion but is not statistically significant. Overall, the data support the judges’
greater conviction proneness but also show that the effect is not universal
and should not be assumed to exist in every locale.
The Appendix also indicates that the relation between conviction and
juror characteristics is not constant across sites. The coefficient for “Male
percent of jury” is positive for two sites and negative for two sites. The coef-
ficients on the African-American and Hispanic percentages of jurors also
change signs across sites. Increased education is associated with lower con-
viction rates in three of four sites and is statistically significant or nearly sig-
nificant in two of them. Overall, the education effect is the most robust
across the aggregate models in Table 9 and the site-level models. But even
this effect is not universal.
B. Explaining Judge-Jury Differences
Table 9 suggests more rigorously than heretofore established the greater
conviction proneness of judges, at least for our sample. It does not reveal
the cases in which judges tend to disagree with juries or explain the cases in
which they disagree. Models of conviction, standing alone, cannot reveal the
pattern of disagreement.
Yet it is the pattern of disagreement that most interested Kalven and
Zeisel. They limited much of their book to discussing cases in which judges
and juries disagreed. After noting the generally high rates of judge-jury
agreement, they all but excluded the agreement cases from their analysis.
They classified disagreements as relating to guilt, charge, or hung-jury status,
and then stated: “The precise quest of this study then is to explain what
caused the disagreements in these 1063 instances, constituting 30 percent
of all trials.”57
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57Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 1, at 110.
Table 7, Panel B, reports summary statistics for jury characteristics
across the possible combination of judge-jury agreement and disagreement.
To further explore disagreement, we divide the cases into three categories—
those in which the judge and jury agreed, those in which the judge would
have convicted but the jury acquitted, and those in which the jury convicted
but the judge would have acquitted. These categories, whose occurrence
rates are reported in Table 1, Panel A, are used to construct a categorical
dependent variable in multinomial logit models.58 The models employ the
same sets of explanatory variables as are used in Table 9.
Table 10 reports the results. Models 1–3 account for the stratified struc-
ture of the sample by site. Models 4–6 use dummy variables to control 
for locale effects. Table 10 suggests that education, a factor helpful in
explaining jurors’ conviction proneness in Table 9, also helps explain judge-
jury disagreement. In all models, the coefficient for “Education level” 
for the jury-convicts/judge-acquits outcome, compared to judge-jury agree
outcome, is negative. This suggests that increased education is associated
with the jury not convicting compared to agreeing with the judge. The coef-
ficient for education for the judge-convicts outcome is consistently positive.
This suggests that greater jury education is associated with the judge con-
victing when the jury would not. In all models other than Model 6, the two
education coefficients are statistically significantly different from each other
(p < 0.05) or nearly so (p < 0.10), even when not statistically significantly dif-
ferent from the agreement reference category.
The two race variables, which played inconsistent roles in explaining
the tendency to convict, are more helpful in explaining judge-jury differ-
ences, but the evidence is mixed. In Models 1–3, an increasing African-Amer-
ican percentage of jurors strongly correlates with the judge tending to
convict when the jury would acquit, but the effect diminishes and becomes
insignificant in Models 4–6, those with locale dummy variables. In Models
4–6, increased Hispanic percentage of the jury is associated with an
increased tendency of the jury to convict when the judge would acquit. To
the extent we find evidence of minority effects, they are more complex than
conventional wisdom suggests.
Site-specific models similar to those in Table 10 are difficult to estimate
because of the small number of cases fitting into one or the other of the two
disagreement categories. Table 3 shows that only the Bronx has more than
Eisenberg et al. 201
58One could also plausibly regard the dependent variable as ordered, but richer information
emerges from a multinomial logit model.
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three cases in each of the two disagreement categories. The other sites’
models generate unrealistically high coefficients and standard errors
because of the lack of variation in outcomes. In a Bronx-only model using
only juror characteristics as explanatory variables, only education statistically
significantly differs between the judge-would-convict and the jury-would-
convict outcomes. As in Table 10, increased education corresponds to the
judge convicting when the jury would not.
V. Conclusion
By controlling for multiple observers’ views of evidentiary strength, we can
confirm with additional rigor, albeit in a smaller sample, Kalven and Zeisel’s
finding that judges tend to convict more than juries—at least in the class of
cases selected for trial by jury. We find little evidence that this effect is a func-
tion of evidentiary complexity or legal complexity. Judges simply appear to
have a higher conviction threshold than juries. But we do not find evidence
that this effect persists in every locale. A replication with more locales 
is needed to fully explore the persistence of the different conviction 
threshold.
Juror effects include a greater willingness of male jurors to convict, and
more highly educated juries being less willing to convict than judges. Minor-
ity juror effects are mixed. They provide little explanatory power of convic-
tions and somewhat greater power in explaining when judges and juries
disagree. However, the effects do not persist at significant levels in models
that control for locale. A richer set of locales is necessary to sort out minor-
ity-group effects, again suggesting the need for a larger study.
To the extent the NCSC data suggest substantial judge-jury agreement,
the results may be conservative. The NCSC sample of districts includes three
sites, Los Angeles, the Bronx, and DC, with substantial or dominant minor-
ity populations. Some believe that convictions are more difficult to obtain
in places with high minority populations, such as the Bronx.59 Suppose one
accepts that minorities are less conviction prone than whites.60 The racial
204 Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases
59Arthur S. Hayes, Inner City Jurors Tend to Rebuff Prosecutors and to Back Plaintiffs, Wall St.
J. Mar. 24, 1994, p. 1, col. 1.
60For references to the literature on stereotypical views of jurors, see Eisenberg & Wells, supra
note 52, at 1839–40 n.3, 1842–43 & nn.17–18 (2002). In general, researchers are skeptical about
breakdown of judges in the four sites strongly suggests that judges in these
jurisdictions are less likely to be minorities than are jurors.61 In the Bronx,
for example, 21 of 29 judges (72 percent) are white but only 14 percent of
the jurors who sat in sampled cases were white Caucasians.62 In Los Angeles,
41 of 52 (79 percent) judges hearing criminal cases are white but only 36
percent of the jurors who sat in sampled cases were white Caucasians. If these
sharp differences in racial composition of judge and juror groups promote
disagreement, then even stronger agreement might be found at sites in
which judge and jury racial proportions are more alike.
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the existence of strong juror demographic effects on case outcomes. Id. at 1850 & n.48.
However, there is growing evidence of juror race effects in capital sentencing. William J. Bowers
et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race
and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 171 (2001) (African-American jurors more
reluctant than white jurors to vote for death in capital cases); Eisenberg et al., supra note 51
(African-American jurors more reluctant than white jurors to vote for death in capital cases);
Garvey et al., supra note 39; Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We
Really Know about Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 997 (2003). For other results consistent with race effects, see Joan M. Cheever &
Joanne Naimann, The View from the Jury Box, Nat’l L.J., Feb. 22, 1993, p. S2 (“Black and white
jurors had starkly contrasting views on how race influences the results of both civil and crimi-
nal trials, with blacks perceiving the system heavily weighted against minorities.”); The View
from the Jury Box: Racial Divide Affects Black, White Panelists, Nat’l L.J., Feb. 22, 1993, p. S8;
Rita James Simon, The Jury and the Defense of Insanity 111 tbl. 45 (1967) (African Americans
voted to acquit more than jurors of other races). But see Carol J. Mills & Wayne E. Bohannon,
Character Structure and Jury Behavior: Conceptual and Applied Implication, 38 J. Personality
& Soc. Psychol. 662, 666 (1980) (personality, not just demographics, shape juror decisions);
Carol J. Mills & Wayne E. Bohannon, Juror Characteristics: To What Extent Are They Related
to Jury Verdicts? 64 Judicature 22, 27 (1980) (reporting study finding African-American females
more conviction prone).
61A recent racial breakdown of the number of judges in the four counties is:
Total Judges Male African American Asian Hispanic
Bronx 29 22 4 0 4
DC 75 48 31 0 3
Los Angeles (criminal) 52 35 5 5 1
Maricopa 87 66 3 1 7
These are the number of judges sitting at the sites according to Garvey et al., supra note 39,
n.8. Except for Los Angeles, the numbers in the table are not limited to judges sitting in crim-
inal cases. In Maricopa County, 29 judges sat in the criminal division fiscal year 2000–2001. See
note 18 supra.
62This excludes 412 jurors with missing race data.
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